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The Rôle of Information 
Concerning the Arbitrator's 
Préférences 
Christopher J. Bruce 
The purpose of this paper is to propose to extend the theo-
retical literature on bargaining under arbitration by categorising 
arbitration Systems not only by the type of sélection procédure 
employed but also by the amount of information conveyed to the 
parties about the préférence function of the arbitrator. 
As the number of jurisdictions employing compulsory arbitration has 
grown, so too has the debate concerning the relative merits of différent Sys-
tems of arbitration1. The major distinction which has been made between 
thèse various Systems has been based upon the sélection procédure em-
ployed. In particular, most authors hâve distinguished between conven-
tional sélection procédures, in which the arbitrator is free to choose any out-
come he wishes, and final-offer sélection procédures, in which the arbitra-
tor is forced to accept "one or the other" of the parties' final positions. 
In this literature, two criteria hâve generally been applied to evaluate 
the relative merits of the différent arbitration Systems. First, they hâve been 
contrasted to identify their "chilling" effects; that is, to détermine the 
degree to which they discourage bargainers from reaching their own agree-
ments2. Secondly, most studies hâve implicitly contrasted the relative effi-
* BRUCE, Christopher J., Associate Professor, Department of Economies, The 
University of Calgary. 
** I would like to thank Jim Markusen and Bob Ford for useful comments on earlier 
drafts. Any remaining errors or omissions are my sole responsibility. 
î Some of the most important articles in this literature include: C M . STEVENS, "Is 
Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?", Industhal Relations, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
February 1966, pp. 38-52; T.P. GILROY and A.V. SINICROPI, "Impasse Resolution in 
Public Employment: A Current Assessment", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25, 
No. 4, July 1972, pp. 496-511; P. FEUILLE and C. LONG, "Final-Offer Arbitration: «Sud-
den Death' in Eugène", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, January 1974, 
pp. 186-203; P. FEUILLE, "Final-Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect", Industhal Rela-
tions, Vol. 14, No. 3, October 1975, pp. 302-310; and C. FEIGENBAUM, "Final-Offer Ar-
bitration: Better Theory Than Practice", Industrial Relations, Vol. 14, No. 3, October 1975, 
pp. 311-317. 
2 For example, see P. FEUILLE, loc. cit. 
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ciency of outcomes attained under the différent Systems. For example, a 
common criticism of final-offer sélection is that it may force the arbitrator 
to choose an outcome which ail parties recognise as being sub-optimal3. 
We believe that a weakness of the existing literature is that it does not 
give adéquate attention to the rôle which information about the arbitrator's 
préférences has on the ability of the parties to reach their own agreement 
and on the efficiency of agreements either reached voluntarily or imposed 
by the arbitrator. Accordingly, in this paper we propose to extend the theo-
retical literature on bargaining under arbitration by categorising arbitration 
Systems not only by the type of sélection procédure employed but also by 
the amount of information conveyed to the parties about the préférence 
function of the arbitrator. In particular, we shall argue that three distinct 
information Systems are possible: the parties may possess full-information, 
limited-information, or no-information about the préférence function of 
the arbitrator. 
Thus, we identify six arbitration Systems rather than the usual two — 
three information Systems, each offering two possible sélection techniques. 
With respect to each of thèse Systems we will analyse the bargaining process 
in order to identify (a) the (Pareto) efficiency of the outcomes and (b) the 
probability that the parties will be able to reach their own settlement. Some 
of our conclusions include: 
1. The most important déterminant of the parties' ability to reach their 
own settlement is not the sélection procédure employed but the amount 
of information conveyed about the arbitrator's préférences. 
2. That there " . . . is no showing that fewer negotiations reach impasse 
(under final-offer arbitration) than would occur under conventional 
arbitration..."4 is due to the fact that most existing arbitration Systems 
provide parties with the same, limited amount of information. 
3. The relative success of the Michigan System in avoiding bargaining im-
passes results because it provides full information5. 
3 For example, see C. FEIGENBAUM, loc. cit., esp. p. 316. 
4 Ibid. 
5 For analyses of the Michigan System see C. FEIGENBAUM, loc. cit.; P. FEUILLE, 
loc. cit.; and C.H. REHMUS, "Is A 'Final Offer' Ever Final?", Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 
97, No. 9, September 1974, pp. 43-45. For a brief description of the Michigan System see sec-
tion I of this paper. 
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INFORMATION CATEGORIES 
In this section we define the three information catégories to be used in 
the paper. 
Full-information 
In a full-information arbitration System the arbitrator announces the 
outcome which he would prefer to choose after hearing the arguments of 
the two parties. He then gives the parties the opportunity — perhaps aided 
by médiation — to reach their own agreement6. If they fail to reach such an 
agreement the arbitrator either imposes his previously-announced outcome 
(full-information, conventional arbitration)7, or uses that outcome to 
choose between the final offers of the two parties (full-information, final-
offer arbitration)8. The System which most closely conforms to our model 
of full-information, conventional arbitration is that used in the fédéral ar-
bitration system of Australia. In this System, the arbitrator is expected to 
make a broad statement of his views before the arbitration hearings take 
place and to encourage the parties to reach their own agreement at that 
time9. The full-information, final-offer model also has an empirical coun-
terpart, in the Michigan final-offer statute. In this System, the parties do not 
hâve to make their final positions known until after the arbitration hearings 
hâve been held. Thus, some parties employ this latitude to delay announce-
ment of their positions until after they hâve been able to " . . . receive some 
indication of the neutraPs views through their appointed représentative to 
the (arbitration) panel."10 
6 What I hâve in mind hère might be referred to as arbitration-mediation, as opposed to 
the conventional mediation-arbitration process. 
7 The sélection technique in which the arbitrator "splits the différence" between the 
parties' final offers may be treated as a variant of full-information, conventional arbitration. 
For, in this technique, both parties are always completely informed about the outcome which 
would be chosen by the arbitrator. 
8 Recently a number of authors hâve suggested that final-offer sélection be modified to 
allow each of the parties to make more than one final offer. (Cf. C.B. DONN, "Games Final-
Offer Arbitrators Might Play", Industrial Relations, Vol. 16, No. 3, October 1977, pp. 
306-314; and V.P. CRAWFORD, "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes", Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, Vol. 87, No. 1, February 1979, pp. 131-159.) However, as our primary interest is 
in the effects of information on arbitration we will deal only with schemes which allow a single 
final offer. 
9 See K.F. WALKER, "Compulsory Arbitration in Australia"; in J. Joseph 
Loewenberg et al., Compulsory Arbitration, D.C. Heath & Co., Lexington, Mass., 1976. 
10 REHMUS, C.H., loc. cit., p. 44. 
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Limited-information 
The parties to a dispute will be said to possess limited information 
about the arbitrator's préférence function if their information is based upon 
précèdent, previous décisions by the arbitrator in question, and/or statu-
tory arbitration criteria. Clearly, most existing arbitration Systems, whether 
conventional or final-offer, fall into this category. 
No-information 
No-information arbitration cannot refer to a situation in which the ar-
bitrator bases his décision on a formai set of criteria. For, even though 
those criteria may not be publicised, they cannot be kept secret as they will 
be revealed through précèdent. Thus, for the negotiators truly to hâve no in-
formation concerning the arbitrator's préférences, the arbitrated outcome 
must be chosen at random. Under conventional sélection this would require 
that the arbitrator sélect at random from a previously-determined set of 
possible outcomes; whereas under final-offer sélection it would require that 
the arbitrator "flip a coin" to détermine which of the two offers would be 
accepted. Alternatively, in a final-offer system, the parties might each be 
asked to submit a list of potential arbitrators before bargaining began. If an 
impasse was reached, an arbitrator would then be chosen at random from 
this list. As the arbitrator so-chosen would normally be expected to sélect 
the final offer of the party which had appointed him, this procédure would 
hâve a similar effect to the sélection of a final offer through the flipping of a 
coin. A form of this modified no-information, final-offer arbitration Sys-
tem has been employed at the University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, 
Alberta. 
In the analysis of each of thèse information Systems it will be necessary 
to employ a model of the bargaining process. It is to the statement of this 
model to which we now turn. 
A BARGAINING MODEL 
The model which we propose to employ in this paper was first deve-
loped by Neil Chamberlain11. In this model, Chamberlain assumes that bar-
11 CHAMBERLAIN, N.W., A General Theory of Economie Process, New York, 
Harper and Bros., 1955, esp. Ch. 6. {Note: we show in an Appendix that Chamberlain's model 
predicts the same results as do the models of Zeuthen and Nash. Chamberlain's model is em-
ployed in this paper because it has the greatest intuitive appeal.) 
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gaining behaviour will be governed by the trade-off between the cost to the 
bargainer of conceding to its opponent's demands — the ''cost of agreeing" 
— and the cost to it of failing to reach any agreement at ail — the "cost of 
disagreeing"12. In particular, the bargaining power of the union is measured 
by the ratio of managements costs of disagreeing and agreeing. That is, the 
union can be said to be in a strong bargaining position if the cost to manage-
ment of disagreeing is high relative to its costs of making a concession. The 
reverse will then be true for managements bargaining power. Thus, the 
bargaining powers of the union and management can be represented by: 
Bargaining power of management = Cost to the union of disagreeing 
Cost of the union of agreeing 
Bargaining power of the union = Cost to management of disagreeing 
Cost to management of agreeing 
The importance of bargaining power in Chamberlain's model is that 
the party with the greater bargaining power is assumed to be able to display 
the greater "commitment" to its position. Thus, the party with the lesser 
power is assumed to be forced to make a concession on its position. In do-
ing so, however, it reduces the opponent's costs of agreeing to that position, 
thereby increasing its own power relative to that of its opponent. If the con-
cession is large enough, the relative bargaining powers of the tv/o parties 
will be reversed and it will then be the opponent who will be forced to offer 
a concession on its position. In this way concession is expected to be foliow-
ed by counterconcession until an agreement is reached. 
We now employ this simple model to analyse the bargaining process 
under each of the three information sytems described in the previous sec-
tion. 
FULL-INFORMATION ARBITRATION 
Conventional Arbitration 
Assume that there are two issues over which management and the 
union are bargaining: an across-the-board wage increase and a change in the 
number of hours worked per week13. Assume further that the union's 
12 In normal collective bargaining, the cost of disagreeing is the cost of a strike. In an ar-
bitration System, however, it is the cost of having to accept the arbitrator's décision rather than 
the party's preferred position. 
13 Although we hâve chosen, for ease of exposition, to considère only two bargaining 
issues, it can easily be shown that our results hold for any situation in which there are more 
than two issues. Thèse results do not hold, however, for a single-issue situation. 
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utility-maximising demand is for a 20 percent increase and a 35 hour work 
week — which, for simplicity, we will dénote as U (20%, 35 hr.) — that 
management's profit-maximising offer is for M (8%, 40 hr.), and that the 
arbitrator has announced that he would award A (12%, 37 hr.) in the event 
of an impasse. If there is an outcome which both parties would prefer to A 
(12%, 37 hr.) then the arbitrator's award may be said to be Pareto ineffi-
cient. On the other hand, if that award is such that any movement away 
from it would leave at least one party worse off, it is said to be Pareto effi-
cient. It is generally assumed in the industrial relations literature that (in-
terest) arbitrators' awards will be inefficient in this sensé. The reason for 
this assumption is that arbitrators cannot be expected to possess sufficient 
information to identify with certainty the préférence functions of both par-
ties, particularly when a large number of issues is being considered. Thus, 
throughout the remainder of the paper we will assume that the arbitrator's 
award is Pareto inefficient, although we certainly do not mean to imply that 
this would always be the case14. 
Given thèse assumptions, the "cost of disagreeing" to each party will 
be the perceived cost of having the arbitrator's award imposed (rather than 
having its own, preferred position accepted); and the "cost of agreeing" 
will be the cost of accepting its opponent's last offer. Under thèse circum-
stances, we anticipate that bargaining will occur as Chamberlain predicted 
and that both sides will make concessions which will move them "towards" 
the arbitrator's announced award15. 
This process can be expected to continue at least until one of the parties 
has offered either the arbitrator's award or an outcome which both sides 
prefer to that award. For example, assume that management off ers out-
come M (13%, 38 hr.), which both it and the union prefer to A (12%, 37 
hr.). The bargaining process at this point undergoes a subtle change as the 
threat that the dispute will go to arbitration subsides — both sides would 
now prefer to settle on management's last offer rather than submit to arbi-
tration. The goal of the union now becomes to find an offer which both it 
and management would prefer to management's last offer. Assume that U 
(15%, 39 hr.) is such an offer. Once this offer has been made, management 
will seek a counteroffer which is preferred by both parties, etc. This process 
will only end when one of the parties has reached a position which cannot be 
u Indeed, there may be situations in which arbitrators can produce awards which are 
superior to the outcomes which the parties would hâve reached themselves. Cf. Christopher 
BRUCE, Private Law and Public Conflict: The Use of Private Arbitration Procédures to 
Résolve Industrial Relations Disputes, Institute of Economie Affairs, London, 1980. 
15 The bargaining process will never tend to converge on an award which one party finds 
less satisfactory than the arbitrator's award, as that party can always obtain the arbitrator's 
award by refusing to bargain. 
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improved upon without making one of the parties worse off. Settlement can 
be expected to occur at this position. 
Thus, the effect of providing full information concerning the arbitra-
tor's preferred award in conventional arbitration is to induce the parties to 
bargain with one another in an attempt to find a resuit which both prefer to 
that award. It seems not unreasonable to anticipate that this bargaining will 
continue until an outcome is found to which altérations cannot be made 
without making at least one party worse off. By définition, such an out-
come is Pareto efficient16. 
Final-offer Arbitration 
The information requirements under final-offer arbitration are much 
more stringent than they are under conventional arbitration. Whereas the 
bargainers would be said to be fully informed in the latter if they knew only 
the award which the arbitrator would impose in the event of an impasse, full 
information in the former requires that they know both the award which the 
arbitrator would wish to impose and his relative préférences for outcomes 
which deviate from that award. For, in final-offer arbitration, the cost of 
disagreement to each party is provided by the threat that the arbitrator will 
sélect the opponent's last offer. Thus, "full information" implies that each 
party is able to détermine which of the two "final" off ers would be selected 
by the arbitrator in the event of an impasse. 
Assuming that the arbitrator is able to provide this information, bar-
gaining can be expected to proceed as follows: First, assume again that the 
union's initial demand is U (20%, 35 hr.), that managements initial offer is 
M (8%, 40 hr.), and that the arbitrator's preferred outcome is A (12%, 37 
hr.). Assume also that the parties are able to détermine that, in the absence 
of further negotiations, the arbitrator would sélect managements offer. 
Clearly, the union will be provided with a very strong incentive to make a 
sufficiently large concession on its initial position that its new demand 
16 In a récent article, Henry FARBER and Harry KATZ ("Interest Arbitration, Out-
comes, and the Incentive to Bargain", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 33(1), October 
1979, pp. 55-63) imply that there will be no bargaining in the face of full-information. (In their 
terminology, our model assumes Y ap = Y^p and G2 = 0.) This différence results from their 
implicit assumption that the arbitrator is considering only one issue and, therefore, that it 
would not be possible to alter the arbitrator's award without making one party worse off. For 
example, if the arbitrator was to décide only on the issue of the across-the-board wage increase, 
and if he were to décide that that increase should be 10 percent, no other figure would be pref-
erred by both sides. Thus, the parties would hâve no reason to bargain with one another. 
However, although this assumption may apply to grievance arbitration it clearly does not apply 
to interest arbitration. 
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would be selected by the arbitrator. In response, management will be induc-
ed to make a further concession in order to ensure that its position would be 
selected, etc. 
As this process of concession and counterconcession will lead the par-
ties to move "doser" and "doser" to the arbitrator's preferred award, A 
(12%, 37 hr.), it can be expected that one of the parties will ultimately be in-
duced to offer that position. Crawford argues that bargaining will cease at 
this point — that is, that the parties will agrée to A (12%, 37 hr.) — because 
neither party " . . . can obtain a seulement he prefers to the equilibrium one 
(in this case, the arbitrator's award) by unilaterally changing his offer."17 
(Emphasis added.) That is, as both parties realise that the arbitrator would 
sélect A (12%, 37 hr.) in the event of an impasse, neither party will be able 
to impose any other outcome on its opponent. 
In our view, Crawford's argument ignores the existence of an impor-
tant alternative which is open to the two parties; namely, that they may 
choose to reach a mutual agreement to a position other than that preferred 
by the arbitrator. For example, assume that the union has offered to accept 
the arbitrator's preferred award of A (12%, 37 hr.). Although management 
will be unable to find an alternative position which would be chosen by the 
arbitrator in the event of an impasse, it may be able to find a position which 
both it and the union prefer to A (12%, 37 hr.). In such a case, we expect 
that it would be able to induce the union either to accept such an outcome 
voluntarily, or to make a counteroffer which both preferred to manage-
ments position. As in the discussion of conventional arbitration, manage-
ment might offer M (13%, 38 hr.), for example, to which the union might 
respond by offering U (15%, 39 hr.), etc. Such a process would only be ex-
pected to end when one party had offered an outcome on which neither par-
ty could make an improvement without making one of them worse off. Fur-
thermore, it seems reasonable to assume that a voluntary agreement would 
be reached at this point18. 
Thus, under full-information, final-offer arbitration bargaining can be 
expected to take place in two stages. In the first stage the parties are drawn 
towards the outcome which is preferred by the arbitrator, an outcome to 
which naive bargainers may agrée. But, if the arbitrator's preferred out-
17 CRAWFORD, loc. cit., note 8, p. 135. 
18 No technical proof of this assertion can be given. For, although there may exist no 
- other outcome which is preferred by both union and management, there will (generally) exist 
other outcomes which are preferred by both the arbitrator and one of the parties. Thus, that 
party might consider it advantageous to offer such an outcome. In this case, the bargaining 
process would begin anew and no prédictions could be made with regard to the eventual out-
come. However, such a strategy would require that one of the parties renege on an offer which 
it had made previously. We shall assume that institutional constraints deter such a stragegy. 
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corne is Pareto inefficient there is no reason to believe that most bargainers 
would not enter into a second stage of negotiations in which they can be ex-
pected to bargain towards a Pareto efficient agreement. It is for this reason 
that we argued in the introduction that the Michigan arbitration System 
(which is a form of full-information, final-offer arbitration) would be suc-
cessful in avoiding impasses. 
Once again, therefore, we conclude that if the parties are fully inform-
ed about the arbitrator's préférences the two parties can be expected to 
reach their own agreement. However, one caveat must be introduced with 
respect to the comparison between conventional and final-offer, full-
information arbitration. That is, in conventional arbitration the parties 
need only know the arbitrator's preferred outcome in order to induce them 
to bargain towards their own agreement; whereas under final-offer arbitra-
tion they must also be well informed concerning the arbitrator's préférence 
function. For, if the parties disagree concerning the shape of that function, 
they may be unable to approach the arbitrator's preferred outcome during 
the first stage of bargaining and an impasse may resuit. 
LIMITED-INFORMATION ARBITRATION 
Conventional Arbitration 
When the bargainers' perceptions of the arbitrator's preferred outcome 
are based on incomplète information, two distinct possibilities arise. First, 
the perceptions of the two parties may differ in such a way that each party 
expects that, in the event of an impasse, the arbitrator will choose an out-
come which is more favourable to its opponent than to itself. We will refer 
to this situation as one in which the parties' perceptions "intersect". For ex-
ample, management may expect that the arbitrator's award will be A m 
(14%, 36 hr.) and the union may expect that it will be A u (10%, 39 hr.). In 
such a case, we would normally expect that the parties would be able to 
reach an agreement without référence to an arbitrator. For the bargaining 
process which we described in section III will lead the union to make conces-
sions which move it "towards" A u (10%, 39 hr.); while management will be 
induced to move "towards" A m (14%, 36 hr.). Eventually, therefore, one 
party will make an offer which the other considers to be at least as satisfac-
tory as the outcome which it believes the arbitrator would award. From that 
point onward, the second party will hâve a strong incentive to settle volun-
tarily rather than to submit to arbitration. Furthermore, there is no reason 
to believe that the seulement so-produced would be Pareto inefficient, as 
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there would be no constraint to prevent the parties from seeking outcomes 
which made them both better off. 
Thus, the initial conclusion must be that if the parties hâve intersecting 
expectations, there will be a strong inducement for them to reach a volun-
tary agreement. But Farber and Katz19 show that this conclusion must be 
tempered in those situations in which the parties are risk-takers. That is, as 
neither party is certain concerning the value of the award which the arbitra-
tor will impose, the award which each of them "expects" to receive will be 
an average of a large number of possible outcomes. Thus, a risk-taking 
negotiator who was dissatisfied with the outcome of voluntary negotiations 
might elect to go to arbitration, not because he expected, on average, to ob-
tain a préférable resuit from arbitration than from voluntary bargaining, 
but because there was some chance that a préférable outcome might be ob-
tained. 
Based on évidence collected by Farber20, however, Farber and Katz 
conclude that negotiators will be risk-averse and, therefore, that this caveat 
will not be of importance. But Farber's évidence relates only to individual 
union members, whereas the negotiating décisions will be made by an agent 
or bargaining team whose préférences may differ from those of the rank-
and-file. Indeed, in a récent study of 111 municipal and school bargaining 
units in six American states, Gerhart and Drotning found persuasive évi-
dence to indicate that " . . . the parties in public-sector bargaining are more 
likely to push disputes on to the terminal step of an impasse procédure — 
whether compulsory arbitration or a strike — the greater their uncertainty 
about future costs and benefits of continued bargaining/'21 Apparently the 
subjects of their interviews were not risk-averse and, therefore, they could 
be expected to choose arbitration even in some situations in which their ex-
pectations concerning the arbitrator's award intersected. 
The second situation which may arise under limited information, con-
ventional arbitration is that in which the perceptions of the parties differ in 
such a way that each party believes that the arbitrator would choose an out-
come which was more favourable to itself than to its opponent. That is, the 
perceptions of the parties concerning the arbitrator's award may be "non-
intersecting". The industrial relations literature gives us reason to believe 
that this situation will be more common than that in which thèse percep-
19 FARBER and KATZ, loc. cit., note 16. 
20 FARBER, Henry S., " Individual Préférences and Union Wage Déterminat ion: The 
Case of the United Mine W o r k e r s " , Journal of Political Economy, 86(6), October 1978, p p . 
923-42. 
21 GERHART, Paul F. and John E. DROTNING, "Do Uncertain Cost/Benefit Esti-
mâtes Prolong Public-Sector Disputes?", Monthly Labor Review, 103(9), September 1980, pp. 
26-30. 
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tions intersect. For, as Walton and McKersie argue in their séminal work, A 
Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations22, one of the most important tac-
tics in the bargaining process is for each party to attempt to convince its op-
ponent of the logic of its own position, while simultaneously attempting to 
belittle the logic of its opponent's position. One of the results of this tactic is 
that each party will convince itselfoï the legitimacy of its own position and, 
therefore, will corne to believe that an arbitrator would favour that position 
in the event of an impasse. 
In such a case, the presumption must be that the parties will generally 
fail to reach a voluntary agreement. Only if they were sufficiently risk-
averse that they would prefer the certainty of a bargained outcome to the 
uncertainty of a potentially superior arbitration award would arbitration be 
avoided. However, although some such situations will undoubtedly exist, 
the évidence presented by Gerhart and Drotning23 indicates that they will be 
much less common than those in which the parties are risk-takers. Thus, 
both theoretical and empirical considérations lead us to conclude that nego-
tiators will reach fewer voluntary agreements in the face of conventional ar-
bitration if they hâve limited information concerning the arbitrator's award 
than if they hâve full information. 
Final-offer Arbitration 
The analysis of limited-information, final-offer arbitration is very 
similar to that of limited-information, conventional arbitration. For exam-
ple, if the parties hâve intersecting expectations concerning the arbitrator's 
préférences, each will believe that it is its opponent's offer which would be 
chosen in the event of an impasse. Therefore, unless they are both risk-
takers, the parties will hâve a very strong inducement to agrée voluntarily. 
On the other hand, if their expectations concerning the arbitrator's préfér-
ences do not intersect, each party will believe that it is its own offer which 
will hâve the greatest chance of being chosen in the event of an impasse. 
Thus, the parties will only be induced to reach their own agreement if they 
are strongly risk-averse. 
Whether limited-information, final-offer arbitration will be able to in-
duce more parties to reach voluntary agreements than will conventional ar-
bitration will dépend upon the degree of risk-aversity within the bargaining 
groups. If the parties' expectations concerning the arbitrator's préférences 
are non-intersecting, as we hâve argued, the bargaining process in both sys-
22 WALTON, R.E. and R.B. McKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, 
London, McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
23 Loc. cit., note 21. 
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tems can be expected to induce the parties to make offers which they believe 
to be "close" to the outcome which the arbitrator prefers. And in each case 
they must then décide whether they consider the benefits to be gained from 
arbitration to be sufficient to overcome the potential losses. Under final-
offer arbitration, the benefit which each party expects to obtain from arbi-
tration is the sélection of its own final offer, weighted by the (relatively 
high) probability that it is that offer which would be chosen by the arbitra-
tor; while the expected loss is represented by the sélection of its opponent's 
final offer, weighted by the (relatively low) probability that it is that offer 
which would be chosen. Under conventional arbitration, however, each 
party will consider there to be a continuum of probabilities of sélection 
across ail outcomes which lie "between" its final offer and the final offer of 
its opponent. This continuum will be skewed in such a way that each party 
will believe that outcomes "close" to its own last offer will hâve a higher 
probability of sélection than will offers which lie "close" to its opponent's 
final offer. Thus, while the probability that a party will be able to obtain ac-
ceptant of its own final position will be greater in final-offer arbitration 
than in conventional arbitration, the probability that its opponent's final 
position will be chosen is also higher. For this reason we anticipate that risk-
averse parties which are not strongly committed to their own positions, but 
which hâve strong aversions to their opponents' positions, will settle volun-
tarily more often in a final-offer system than in a conventional System. On 
the other hand, if the parties are not risk-averse, of if they hâve strong com-
mitments to their own positions, there is no reason to believe that they 
would seek a voluntary settlement under final-offer arbitration more often 
than under conventional arbitration. Indeed, if the parties are risk-takers, 
they will be less likely to settle voluntarily under final-offer than under con-
ventional arbitration. 
To conclude, as it is our belief that most failures in contract negotia-
tions arise because one, or both, of the parties is a risk-taker or has a strong 
attachment to a particular position, the model developed in this section 
gives us no reason to believe that limited-information, final-offer arbitra-
tion will produce a (voluntary) settlement rate which is significantly higher 
than that found under limited-information, conventional arbitration. Fur-
thermore, as final-offer arbitration forces a choice between two incompati-
ble positions when bargaining fails, there are strong reasons for preferring 
the conventional sélection process to the final-offer process. 
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NO-INFORMATION 
Conventional Arbitration 
In no-information, conventional arbitration, the arbitrator sélects his 
award at random from among a predetermined set of possible outcomes. 
Thus, the "cost of disagreeing" to each party is measured primarily by the 
attitude which it takes towards the uncertainty which such a procédure 
créâtes. That is, the probability that a highly unfavourable outcome would 
be selected becomes so great that only a party with a dominant "tasle" for 
risk would be willing to submit its disputes to such a random procédure. 
Thus, no-information, conventional arbitration provides a very strong in-
ducement for the parties to reach a voluntary agreement. The prïmary, 
practical difficulty with this procédure arises when this inducement is not 
strong enough to avoid an impasse. For in that case a random sélection 
must be made, a sélection which will hâve no basis in the merits of the case. 
Final-offer Arbitration 
The particular variant of no-information, final-offer arbitration which 
we wish to investigate is that which is employed at the University of 
Lethbridge. That is, in the event of an impasse an arbitrator is chosen at 
random from a partisan panel which has been selected in advance. This ar-
bitrator then chooses between the parties' final offers, which had been 
made before his sélection. 
Assuming that the arbitrator chosen in this way will normally choose 
the final offer put forward by the party which nominated him, during the 
negotiation process each side will believe that there is a 50 percent chance 
that its position would be selected in the event of an impasse. In such a Sys-
tem there will be an incentive for the two parties to "trade" concessions as 
long as the value which each party places on the concession which it makes 
exceeds the value which it places on the concession obtained in exchange. 
For example, if the union has demanded a 15 percent wage increase and 
management has offered a 5 percent increase, they might both consider it to 
be a "fair" trade if the union moderated its demand to 13 percent while the 
firm raised its offer to 6 percent. Provided only that management finds in-
créments in its offer to be increasingly costly and that the union finds each 
réduction in its demands to be similarly more costly24, this bargaining pro-
cess can be expected to bring the parties into agreement with one another. 
Furthermore, because such an agreement would be reached voluntarily we 
can expect that it would be Pareto efficient25. 
24 Our assumption is that management's marginal cost, and the union's marginal dis-
utility, of concessions are both increasing functions of the number of concessions made. 
25 If the outcome was not efficient, the parties would be free to alter that outcome to 
their mutual benefit. 
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However, there is an important situation in which the bargaining pro-
cess can be expected to break down. Assume that both sides are strongly 
committed to obtaining a particular outcome. For example, management 
might feel that it could not afford a pay increase in excess of 10 percent 
while the union felt that it could not accept an increase of less than 15 per-
cent. Each side may consider the cost of even a small concession on its posi-
tion to be so great that neither would be able to induce the other to alter its 
final offer. Thus, bargaining would reach an impasse and the arbitration 
procédure would hâve to be invoked. 
EQUITY 
We hâve argued that under full-information arbitration the parties to a 
dispute can be expected to reach their own Pareto efficient seulement. But 
that settlement is only efficient relative to the arbitrator's preferred out-
come. Economists hâve yet to develop a rigorous criterion against which the 
arbitrator's outcome itself can be judged. Yet it appears intuitively clear 
that some such outcomes may be considered unjust or inéquitable. In thèse 
cases,the discovery of a relatively efficient agreement will not rectify this in-
equity26. 
Thus, it may be désirable to devise a bargaining instrument in which 
the ultimate outcome is not determined by some arbitrary exogenous factor, 
such as an arbitrator's préférences, monopoly power, or the ability to withs-
tand a strike, but by the parties own perceptions of equity and efficiency. 
We would suggest that no-information, final-offer arbitration represents 
such an instrument. For, in this System, the arbitrator's préférences play no 
rôle in the détermination of a bargained settlement, and the primary déter-
minant of the ultimate outcome is the parties own views of the relative 
merits of their cases. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our basic theoretical finding is that the ability of bargainers to reach 
their own agreements is determined primarily by the amount of information 
which they possess concerning the arbitrator's préférences27. As this infor-
26 For example, assume that the arbi trator has announced that his preferred outcome is 
A (12%, 37 hr . ) . Although the parties may still be able to agrée voluntarily to settle for the 
Pareto superior outcome (14%, 39 hr . ) , the arbi t ra tor ' s announcement will act as a major 
déterrent to their ability to reach voluntary agreement to (14%, 35 hr . ) or (10%, 39 hr . ) regard-
less of whether society considered those outcomes to be superior to (14%, 39 hr . ) . 
27 This theoretical finding is given strong empirical support by GERHART and 
DROTNING (loc. cit., note 21). 
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mation increases, the settlement rate increases also. An important implica-
tion of this finding is that it would be inappropriate to contrast settlement 
rates under various conventional and final-offer arbitration Systems with-
out first making allowance for différences in the amounts of information 
provided in those Systems. 
Our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, the settlement rate under 
limited-information, final-offer arbitration will not differ significantly 
from that under limited-information, conventional arbitration. However, it 
also predicts that any agreement reached under either of thèse Systems will 
be strongly influenced by the outcome which the parties believe would be 
imposed by an arbitrator; for at least one party will prefer to seek arbitra-
tion rather than accept a settlement which déviâtes significantly from the ar-
bitrator's expected award. Thus, voluntary agreements reached under 
limited information cannot be expected to differ appreciably from those 
reached under full information. And, as full-information arbitration Sys-
tems can be expected to produce higher settlement rates than can limited-
information Systems, greater gains could be made by a movement from the 
latter to the former than by a movement from conventional to final-offer 
arbitration within the limited-information mode. 
Given that the full information System has been adopted, our model 
suggests that conventional arbitration will be superior to final-offer arbitra-
tion. First, as the conventional sélection process requires that less informa-
tion be provided to the parties than does the final-offer process, (the former 
requires knowledge only of the arbitrator's award whereas the latter re-
quires knowledge of his complète préférence function), the former would be 
easier to implement than the latter and could, therefore, be expected to pro-
duce a higher settlement rate. And, secondly, conventional arbitration pro-
ves superior in the event that negotiations reach an impasse. That is, 
although the arbitrator in a conventional System cannot, as a rule, be ex-
pected to be able to produce a Pareto efficient award, at least he is able to 
take into account the préférences of both parties when constructing that 
award. Under final-offer arbitration, on the other hand, the arbitrator is 
forced to accept one-or-the-other of the parties' final positions, effectively 
ignoring the préférences of the second party altogether. 
Finally, we hâve argued that both full-information and limited-
information arbitrations place severe limitations on the parties which con-
strain them to bargain over outcomes which are "in the vicinity" of the ar-
bitrator's (expected) award. Thus, although the parties may be able to ob-
tain their own, Pareto efficient settlement in the face of such a constraint, 
there is no reason to believe that such a settlement will be seen to be "fair" 
or "équitable" in the eyes of the participants. 
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One method of avoiding this inequity would be to employ no-
information, final-offer arbitration. As the parties in this System hâve no 
prior indication as to how the arbitrator would reach his décision, that déci-
sion cannot constrain the bargaining process. Thus, there is reason to 
believe that voluntary settlements reached under no-information, final-
offer arbitration will not only be Pareto efficient but will be seen, by the 
parties, to be équitable. 
The primary drawback to this type of arbitration is that the incentive 
which it provides the parties to reach a voluntary agreement is much less 
than that offered by full — and limited-information arbitrations. Thus, it 
would be inadvisable to employ such a System in a situation in which the 
parties might be expected to commit themselves to extrême positions. 
La connaissance par les parties des préférences de l'arbitre 
et les types d'arbitrage 
Au cours des derniers dix ans, beaucoup de choses se sont écrites sur l'arbitrage 
des conflits d'intérêts qui ont consisté à mettre en contraste deux façons de procéder: 
l'arbitrage traditionnel, dans lequel l'arbitre est libre de choisir la décision qu'il dési-
re, et l'arbitrage des propositions finales où il est forcé de choisir l'une ou l'autre des 
deux propositions finales des parties. En outre, ces études comparatives visaient 
d'abord à faire ressortir la valeur relative des deux processus pour amener les parties 
à conclure elles-mêmes des conventions collectives. 
Le présent article considère que l'intérêt porté à l'examen de ces deux processus 
a eu pour effet de mettre en veilleuse une deuxième caractéristique du régime d'arbi-
trage, qui est tout aussi importante pour déterminer si les parties peuvent s'entendre 
de gré à gré, soit le degré de connaissance que possèdent les parties contractantes de 
la décision de l'arbitre s'il y avait impasse ou rupture. Le but de l'article est d'évaluer 
le résultat de cette connaissance tant dans le système d'arbitrage traditionnel que 
sous le système d'arbitrage dit des propositions finales. 
Ou les parties peuvent connaître la décision de l'arbitre (celui-ci leur dit ce que 
serait sa décision); ou elles en ont une connaissance relative, limitée (il s'agit alors de 
décisions antérieures du même arbitre, de précédents, de critères préfix); ou elles 
n'en savent rien du tout (l'arbitre garde toute liberté de décision). Le fait que les par-
ties connaissent les conclusions de l'arbitre les incite fortement à s'entendre, qu'il 
s'agisse de l'arbitrage traditionnel ou de l'arbitrage des propositions finales. Cepen-
dant, comme la connaissance des intentions de l'arbitre est beaucoup plus convain-
cante dans le deuxième cas que dans le premier, l'arbitrage traditionnel est préférable 
à l'arbitrage des propositions finales, lorsque les préférences de l'arbitre sont con-
nues. En effet, les propositions finales exigent que les négociateurs sachent en tout 
temps laquelle de leurs propositions serait choisie, tandis que l'arbitrage traditionnel 
exige seulement qu'ils soient au courant de la décision que l'arbitre favorisera. 
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En deuxième lieu, on peut affirmer que la possibilité pour les deux parties d'en 
venir à une entente lorsqu'elles n'ont qu'une connaissance limitée des intentions de 
l'arbitre dépendra de leurs attitudes face au risque. Si les deux parties aiment à ris-
quer, on peut s'attendre à ce qu'elles aient de la difficulté à s'entendre de gré à gré, 
particulièrement si leurs estimations de la conclusion de l'arbitre ne coïncident pas. 
Ce n'est que si les négociateurs ne tiennent pas à courir des risques que le modèle 
théorique exposé conduit à une double conclusion: 1) soit que les parties seront en 
mesure de régler volontairement la plupart de leurs différends lorsqu'elles disposent 
d'une connaissance relative des préférences de l'arbitre; 2) soit, également, qu'il y 
aura plus de règlements de gré à gré dans le cas de l'arbitrage des propositions finales 
que dans le cas de l'arbitrage traditionnel. 
En troisième lieu, les parties peuvent généralement en arriver à un accord volon-
taire et efficace, si l'arbitre choisit sa décision sans fournir aucun indice de ses préfé-
rences. Cependant, ce système est inférieur aux autres, lorsqu'il n'y a pas d'accord. 
Finalement, l'article conclut que l'une des conséquences de ce modèle, c'est que 
les comparaisons des règlements obtenus sous les systèmes d'arbitrage traditionnel 
ou d'arbitrage des propositions finales ne vaudraient pas, à moins qu'un ajustement 
ne soit effectué pour tenir compte des différences se rapportant à la connaissance des 
tendances exprimées par l'arbitre. Ainsi, le modèle démontre que le nombre d'enten-
tes de gré à gré dans le cas de l'arbitrage des propositions finales en pleine connais-
sance des préférences de l'arbitre est plus élevé que dans le cas de l'arbitrage tradi-
tionnel avec connaissance limitée des tendances de l'arbitre, non pas à cause de la 
différence entre les deux systèmes d'arbitrage, mais à cause de la différence du degré 
de connaissance des préférences de l'arbitre. 
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